Why I stopped.
The demand was real. The business underneath it wasn't. These are the four things the work surfaced.
Licensed centers live under staff-to-child ratios and licensed capacity caps. An unfilled seat is only bookable if the ratio still holds that day, so the "idle capacity" shrank to a fraction of what the occupancy numbers implied.
Every new child means enrollment records, immunization proof, emergency contacts and liability paperwork, much of it mandated per jurisdiction. A same-day booking had to carry all of that, and each city rewrote the rules.
Same-day drop-in is a small, episodic slice of childcare spending. Most families solve the emergency a few times a year, which is too little frequency to earn back the cost of acquiring them.
Parents and centers both wanted vetting, insurance and recourse. Those costs are fixed per center and per family, and a per-booking fee on low-frequency usage couldn't cover them.
What held up: the 122 conversations, the 60-second booking flow, and the trust layer. Parents wanted to see their child's day, not just reserve it. I took those with me and pivoted.